Virginia is for Loving

This article reporting that Virginia is likely to amend its Bill of Rights (originally drafted by George Mason) to include a ban on gay marriage immediately prompts the thought - what do you expect from the state (excuse me, commonwealth) that gave us massive resistance and Loving v. Virginia? It might be best to begin with a few quotes from the Washington Post article:
The state Senate all but guaranteed on Wednesday that Virginia will hold a November referendum on whether to amend its 230-year-old Bill of Rights to bar same-sex marriages.
"The family is the foundation of our society, and it's been based on a union of a man and a woman since the inception of marriage," said Del. John A. Cosgrove (R-Chesapeake). "A constitutional amendment . . . will protect that."
The Bill of Rights was written by George Mason, a founding father of Virginia and the United States. "It's essentially the same document it was in 1776 in body and spirit," said A.E. Dick Howard, a professor of constitutional law at the University of Virginia, who led a commission responsible for writing the state's current constitution.
The amendment barring same-sex marriage would be added to Section 15, which begins by saying, "That no free government, nor the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue . . . "
The Virginia Bill of Rights served as a model for other states and for the first 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
The marriage amendment would say in part, "That only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this Commonwealth and its political subdivisions."
According to a column published in the Post in June 2004, Virginia has already outlawed not only gay marriage but civil unions:
When gay marriage came up, Virginia was among the first states to preemptively ban it, in 1997. Moreover, Virginia is the only state to forbid even private companies, unless self-insured, from extending health insurance benefits to unmarried couples. That provision affects cohabiting straights but works a far greater hardship on gay couples, who cannot marry.
Opponents of the gay marriage ban have, of course, drawn a parallel to the commonwealth's statutes barring interracial marriage which were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia. Advocates of the proposed constitutional ban on gay marriage decry the analogy. This is from a Baptist website:
The interracial marriage ban was clearly built on a history of preserving the idea of racial purity and racial superiority of one race over another,” she told BP. “The requirement that a man and a woman be the applicants for a marriage license is not built on a history that men are superior to women or that women are superior to men.”Instead, Collett said, the traditional definition of marriage is “built on the history” that when a man and a woman come together in marriage, they do something that is “unique throughout all human activities” -- creating new life.
The same website contains the following arguments against gay marriage:
Evangelicals say that homosexual relationships will never bring satisfaction because, at the core, they involve rebellion against God.
The arguments against gay marriage appear to be as follows - gay marriage violates the traditional notion of marriage and is either profoundly unnatural or violates God's commandments as they relate to sexual activity and marriage. Because the traditional limitation on marriage to heterosexual unions has been accepted without question over the generations by lawmakers and courts, only activist judges who usurp the role of the legislature can declare these limitations unconstitutional.
To what extent are these views similar to those advanced by the supporters of Virginia's ban on interracial marriage in 1967?
The trial judge in the Loving case clearly viewed interracial marriage as unnatural and contrary to God's commandments. He stated;
"Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix."
The commonwealth argued the issue in a more restrained way before the Supreme Court. It merely contended that the Virginia legislature could reasonably conclude that sound public policy supported a ban on interracial marriage. Its brief argued that the Supreme Court should not inquire into the desirability of a ban on interracial marriage but if it did so:
it would quickly find itself mired in a veritable Serbonian bog of conflicting scientific opinion upon the effects of interracial marriage, and the desirability of preventing such alliances, from the physical, biological, genetic, anthropological, cultural, psychological and sociological point of view.
The brief went on to cite "scientific" authority for the proposition that interracial "breeding" would lead to undesirable consequences and would tend to extinguish the inherent "qualities" of each race:
Prof. U. G. Weatherly writes: 'It is an unquestionable fact that the yellow, as well as the negroid peoples possess many desirable qualities in which the whites are deficient. From this it has been argued that it would be advantageous if all races were blended into a universal type embodying the excellencies of each. But scientific breeders have long ago demonstrated that the most desirable results are secured by specializing types rather than by merging them. "'The color line is evidence of an attempt, based on instinctive choice, to preserve those distinctive values which a racial group has come to regard as of the highest moment to itself.'
However, in its decision in the Naim case, decided in 1955 just twelve years before Loving, the Virginia Supreme Court had been considerably less abashed in defending the commonwealth's ban on interracial marriage:
'Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is, nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required to deal.'
In this State marriage is treated as a civil contract, but it is more than a mere civil contract. It is a public institution established by God himself, is recognized in all Christian and civilized nations, and is essential to the peace, happiness, and well-being of society. * * * The right, in the states, to regulate and control, to guard, protect, and preserve this God-given, civilizing, and Christianizing institution is of inestimable importance, and cannot be surrendered, nor can the states suffer or permit any interference therewith. If the federal government can determine who may marry in a state, there is no limit to its power. It was said . . . that the question was one of difference between the races, not of superiority or inferiority, and that the natural law which forbids their intermarriage and the social amalgamation which leads to a corruption of races is as clearly divine as that which imparted to them different natures.
However, by 1967, the Commonwealth brief's chief argument before the Supreme Court was simply that the Fourteenth Amendment's legislative history clearly indicated that its drafters had no intention to strike down "anti-miscegenation" statutes:
an analysis of the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment conclusively establishes the clear understanding--both of the legislators who framed and adopted the Amendment and the legislatures which ratified it--that the Fourteenth Amendment had no application whatever to the anti-miscegenation statutes of the various States and did not interfere in any way with the power of the States to adopt such statutes. The precise question was specifically considered by the framers of the Amendment, and a clear intent to exclude such statutes from the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment was repeatedly made manifest.
Therefore, it followed inexorably that only "activist" judges could overturn the Virginia statute barring interracial marriage:
Such arguments [in favor of interracial marriage on "policy" grounds] are properly addressable to the legislature, which enacted the law in the first place, and not to this court, whose prescribed role in the separated powers of government is to adjudicate, and not to legislate.
The commonwealth may well have had the best of this argument. The Supreme Court itself acknowledged that:
As for the various statements directly concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, we have said in connection with a related problem, that although these historical sources "cast some light" they are not sufficient to resolve the problem; "[at] best, they are inconclusive.["]
In fact, the Loving case seems to me to illuminate the essential problem with an originalist view of constitutional interpretation that relies heavily on the intentions of the founders or the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. That Amendment and the Bill of Rights articulate fundamental principles of human rights and republican government in sweeping terms but their authors clearly intended their application to be limited in ways we now find offensive and untenable. Take, for example, Virginia's own Declaration of Rights, which is widely acknowledged as the model for the Bill of Rights. Article One of the Declaration reads as follows:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety
This principle strikes us as utterly incompatible with chattel, race-based slavery. But its authors, in accord with their self-interest and racial views, did not regard it as emancipating slaves (or women). Today, many would regard these same principles as incompatible with efforts to deny gays the full scope of civil rights. The Virginia legislature apparently disagrees.
Perhaps it is best to close with an excerpt from a friend of the court brief courageously filed by the Catholic Bishop of Richmond, Virginia in the Loving case:
It should be emphasized that we are concerned here with personal liberty, personal rights. It is the individual's free exercise of religion that is safeguarded by the United States Constitution. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), in describing the area of personal liberty protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, speaks of the "right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. . . ."